[turtle]

It is interesting that you mention precedent. That is starting to be addressed on page 35 where I'm reading now:

We have long recognized, however, that stare decisis is “not an inexorable command,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and it “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 208, 235 (1997). It has been said that it is sometimes more important that an issue “be settled than that it be settled right.” Kimble, 576 U.S, at 455 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1982) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution—the “great charter of our liberties,” which was meant “to endure through a long lapse of ages,” Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (opinion of Story, J)—we place a high value on having the matter “settled right.” In addition, when one of our constitutional decisions goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the bad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erroneous constitutional decision can be fixed by amending the Constitution, but our Constitution is notoriously hard to amend. See U.S. Const., art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S. at 456. Therefore, in appropriate circumstances we must be willing to reconsider and if necessary overrule constitutional decisions.

Some of our most important constitutional decisions have overruled prior precedents. We mention three. In Brown. v. Board of Education, the Court repudiated the “separate but equal” doctrine, which had allowed States to maintain racially segregated schools and other facilities. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). In so doing, the Court overruled the infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with six other Supreme Court precedents that had applied the separate-but-equal rule. See Brown, 347 U.S., at 491. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 879 (1937), the Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261U. 8.525 (1923), which had held that a law setting minimum wages for women violated the “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id., at 545. West Coast Hotel signaled the demise of an entire line of important precedents that had protected an individual liberty right against state and federal health and welfare logislation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding invalid a law setting maximum working hours); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding invalid a law banning contracts forbidding employees to join union); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (holding invalid laws fixing the weight of loaves of bread). Finally, in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), aftor the lapse of only three years, the Court overruled Minersuille School Dist. v. Gobilis, 310 U. S. 536 (1940), and held that public school students could ot be compelled to salute the flag in violation of their sincore belies. Barnette stands out because nothing had changed during the intervening period other than the Court's belated recognition that its earlier decision had been seriously wrong.

So changing a precedent isn't unheard of, just done when there is GREAT cause to use my own terms.

No Justice of this Court has ever argued that the Court should never overrule a constitutional decision, but overruling a precedent is a serious matter. It is not a step that should be taken lightly. Our cases have attempted to provide a framework for deciding when a precedent should be overruled, and they have identified factors that should be considered in making such a decision. Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. _, __ (2018) (slip op., at 34-35); Ramos v. Louisiana, 500 U.S. __ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7-9.

forgive the error from PDF to Text conversion. I'm trying to fix most of them as I paste them but I'm sure to miss plenty. Feel free to read the opinion yourself though.